Michael Della Rocca kreeg nog eens gelegenheid het PSR-belang uit te leggen
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Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the
Structure of Reality. Cambridge University Press, (nov.) 2012, 317pp.
Ook Spinoza's begrip van de structuur van de werkelijkheid komt aan bod:
Er kan maar één substantie zijn
Michael Della Rocca werd uitgenodigd nog eens
over de PSR bij Leibniz en Spinoza te schrijven. In de inleiding vatten de
redacteuren zijn hoofdstuk als volgt samen:
“Chapter 5 - 'Violations of the Principle of
Sufficient Reason (in Leibniz and Spinoza)'. Some important versions of the
Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) state that everything (literally
everything; or every fact; or every truth; ...) is grounded. The PSR, in one
form or another, notoriously played an important role in the philosophies of
Spinoza and Leibniz. Leibniz, for instance, endorsed the PSR friendly principle
that whenever some objects stand in a relation, the relation must be grounded in
some thing(s). Della Rocca argues (Section 5.1) that this principle led Leibniz
to the idealist conclusion that relations are grounded in a mind (ultimately,
in God's mind). Yet this conclusion is in conflict with Leibniz's own view that
certain relations are real and not merely ideal, e.g. creation and the causal
relation that links a substance and its states (Section 5.2). Leibniz is caught
in a dilemma: either deny that there are pluralities of objects standing in
relations, or deny the PSR friendly principle mentioned above. Della Rocca
defends the view (Section 5.3) that Spinoza is able to avoid the dilemma by
taking both horns, holding that multiplicities and relational states do not
exist fully but still enjoy existence to a lesser degree, and holding that some
relations do violate the PSR friendly principle, these violations being
nevertheless less than fully existent. Della Rocca finally argues (Section 5.4)
that Leibniz cannot adopt Spinoza's strategy, which ultimately relies on his
monism, i.e. the view that there (fully) exists only one substance — a view
which Della Rocca himself tentatively endorses.”
De NDPR heeft vandaag een review over dit boek,
waarbij vergeten werd de naam van de reviewer te vermelden, die de recensie begint met 'grondig' uit te leggen wat met 'gronding'/fundering bedoeld wordt: wat is gebaseerd op/afhankelijk van wat. Over dit
hoofdstuk schreef de reviewer dat fundering erin als een toepassing van of vorm van ontologie wordt gezien:
“Chapter 5: Michael Della Rocca's "Violations of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (in Leibniz and Spinoza)" presents the dilemma that, on pain of inconsistency, one must either take some relations to be ungrounded or else reject (non-reflexive) relations by adopting the monistic view that only the world itself fundamentally exists. The dilemma seems intractable for Leibniz because his commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason precludes the first horn and his commitment to God's creating us precludes the second horn. Inspired by Spinoza, Della Rocca's initial solution takes relations, and hence their ungroundedness, to be neither "fully" intelligible nor "fully" real. But then Della Rocca argues that the initial solution ultimately requires monism. This seems to obviate Della Rocca's initial solution, since monism would have directly avoided the dilemma." [NDPR]
Aanvulling 14:30 uur
"Interest surges in a
distinctively metaphysical notion of ground, as witnessed by a recent
anthology dedicated to it (Correia and Schnieder 2012). Devotees of
ground (e.g., Fine 2001; Rosen 2010; and Raven, 2012) say it belongs in the
metaphysician's toolbox, whereas Infidels (e.g., Hofweber 2009; and
Wilson, unpublished manuscript) demur.
A Schism has formed among Devotees. Orthodoxy
says ground induces a strict partial order structure on reality, from the more
derivative to the more fundamental. Heresy denies that ground is a
strict partial order: ground is either not irreflexive (Jenkins 2011) or not
transitive (Schaffer 2012).
What's at stake? The structure of reality, answer
Devotees. Even Infidels have a stake: they might take Devotees' infighting as
evidence against ground's coherence (cf. Wilson). [APQ]
