Theses over de lichaam-geest verhouding bij Spinoza

Hier houd ik even vast - en geef ik aan de belangstellenden door - de twee theses over de lichaam-geest verhouding bij Spinoza die ik recent tegenkwam.

Een master thesis van Jonne Hagen, The Human Mind in Spinoza’s Ethics [2011, Utrecht University] – cf.

Heeft het – opmerkelijk - over de “human mind as an individual under the attribute of thought.”

We cannot render individualization under the attribute of thought intelligible by appealing to physical mechanisms of individualization. [17]

En zomaar komt uit de lucht vallen: “‘being a complex individual’ appears to be a fairly attribute-neutral property belonging both to physical and mental modes.” [18] Deze kennelijk van Bennett afkomstige typering wordt verder niet toegelicht.

Interessant om kennis te nemen van het werkstuk, vooral door een zeer uitgewerkt gedachte-experiment.

Verder staat al wat langer op internet de doctorsthesis van Margaret Gullan-Whur, waar ik op stuitte via een recente
tweet van haar naar haar reactie op een blog, "Spinoza, Self Help and Agency" van Mike LaBossiere, waarin ze verwees naar de link naar haar thesis. Net zo negatief als ze als biografe over haar hoofdpersoon was, net zo negatief is ze in haar beoordeling van zijn ‘theory of mind.’

Gullan-Whur, Margaret, A Perspective On The Mind-Body Problem, With Particular Reference To The Philosophy Of Spinoza. PhD thesis, 1999 [in 2008 op internet gezet? Cf.)

Abstract: Spinoza's thesis of non-reductive monism was conceived in critical response to earlier dualist and materialist theories of mind. He rejects dualism with respect to both God- Nature and mind-body, yet his principles mark off the mental as severely as is possible without forfeiting monism, showing his awareness that monism (attribute identity) threatens mental irreducibility. The constraints Spinoza imposes in order to preserve mental irreducibility and to make human beings partial expressions of one thinking and extended substance produce a tension between mental autonomy and mind-body identity. However, I propose that while this remains a serious philosophical problem, some degree of tension must persist in any non-reductive monism which succeeds in giving the mental a weighting equal to the physical, and that Spinoza's sensitivity to this requirement is instructive. I argue, on the other hand, that Spinoza's theory of mind is irrevocably damaged by his turning of the traditional Mind of God into the Mind of the Whole of Nature in so far as he extrapolates from this Mind of God-or-Nature to finite minds. In characterising finite minds as partial expressions of "God's" infinite intellect I believe Spinoza becomes caught between his unorthodox conception of God's Mind as all-inclusive and a retained conception of the Mind of God as all truths. I argue that by characterising our thoughts as fractions of the adequate and true ideas "in God", that is, by claiming them (i) to express in some measure immediate judgement; (ii) to have a state of our body as a necessary feature of their representational content, and (iii) to have a place in a determined, lawlike mental concatenation, Spinoza creates a tension between two mental perspectives, namely a metaphysical explanation of human mental states, and our ordinary mental experiences. I argue that he fails acceptably to characterise the latter and that his theory of mind is therefore unsatisfactory Philosophy of Mind.

[3] Hieraan voeg ik nog toe de verwijzing naar
Colin Marshall, THE MIND AND THE BODY AS ‘ONE AND THE SAME THING’ IN SPINOZA. In: British Journal for the History of Philosophy (2009) 17:5, 897Ā]919 [PDF]