Jeffrey Bell over Richard Mason en "Spinoza or Leibniz"
Al jaren geleden las ik op het blog “Aberant Monism” van
Het verschil in spreken ‘de re’ versus ‘de dictu’ [Cf.]
schreef in zijn blog van 26 maart 2011 [ik citeer hier slechts één alinea, maar zoals gezegd, het hele blog is lezing waard]:
“As Richard Mason argues in his book on Spinoza, The God of Spinoza, Edwin Curley is quite right when he claims that ‘One thing every interpreter of Spinoza agrees on is that Spinoza connects causal relation with the relation of logical consequence’; but once this move is made, Mason correctly notes, then Spinoza’s thought is open to the Humean criticism that follows upon his arguments that causal relations are not logical relations. But are we justified in following Curley when he claims that despite Spinoza’s talk of the existence of things rather than what can be correctly said of things that this ‘need not prevent us,’ he argues, ‘from translating what he says about things into talk about truths and developing a general account of necessary truth that will accord with Spinoza’s intentions.’ This ties in with the arguments Mason makes in his book, Before Logic [..], that between Spinoza and Leibniz there is a choice: Spinoza prefers to talk about things without worrying whether such talk can be translated into a modal logic of necessary truth, and Leibniz attempts to translate talk about things into talk about truths and the modal logic that comes with this.”
Eerder, op 10 februari 2011 had hij een blog “Spinoza or Leibniz” waarin hij zich grotendeels op Richard Mason’s Before Logic baseerde, maar ook duidelijk eigen ideeën en kennis inbracht, waardoor het een opmerkelijk en boeiend blog werd (dat o.a. door Pierre Bourdieu zou zijn opgemerkt). Ik zou graag dat hele nog altijd belangwekkende stuk hier overnemen, maar dat kan niet zomaar en ik volsta met het attenderen erop door alleen de openingsalinea te citeren.“In his excellent book, Before Logic, Richard Mason (who also has a nice book on Spinoza, The God of Spinoza) argues that problems in logic as logicians understand them, and as they attempt to resolve them, are themselves consequences of particular choices, choices that exclude options that might have been on the table had another choice been made. Mason is quite adamant that this does not involve historicizing logic, nor does he adhere to an ahistorical view of logic. The arguments of Mason’s small book are all ‘intended,’ as he claims in the final lines of his book, ‘to show how logic must be part of philosophy, not in any sense before it. Too much must come first.’ And some of what comes first are particular interests and choices that set the stage for the logical.” [Hier meer]